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Abstract—This paper proposes a unified noncooperative game
for discrete power minimization in wireless networks. We prove
that the proposed game, with a carefully chosen payoff function,
falls into the framework of potential games where pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. The feasibility of the pure strategy
NE is guaranteed with properly designed penalty functions and
penalty factors. It is revealed that the optimal solution to the sum
discrete power minimization problem constitutes a pure strategy
NE of the proposed game under mild conditions. Also, we prove
that the pure strategy NE of the proposed game is also the optimal
solution to the sum discrete power minimization problem under
some particular conditions. An iterative algorithm is then devised
to obtain the pure strategy NE. Two examples which can be solved
efficiently by using our framework are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power control can be used to minimize power consumption
and improve energy efficiency in wireless networks and has
received much attention in research. The study of power
control can be generally divided into two categories: (1)
power control with continuous strategies [1]–[7] and (2) power
control with discrete strategies [8]–[13].
While power is naturally continuous, in practice, there are
only a number of quantized values to operate at [8]. The study
of discrete power control is therefore of practical relevance and
significance. However, the existing literature in discrete power
control is limited to the application in cellular networks under
some conditions [8]–[10], [14]–[16]. For examples, the frame-
work in [14] needs that the interference function is standard,
[10] only consider several typical constraints (e.g., average
power constraints), the game model in [15] needs that the
utility function of the game player should be supermodular or
submodular. Discrete power control for more general wireless
networks, e.g., with non standard problems, such as cognitive
radio networks, D2D communication systems, and so on, is
much less understood.
Motivated by [2], [11]–[13], this paper presents a unified
game-theoretic framework for constrained discrete power min-
imization problems. Our main contribution is the design of
the payoff function and the penalty function such that the
feasibility of the Nash equilibrium (NE) ensures satisfaction of
the constraints. Based on the our specially designed functions,
the application scenarios of the framework in this paper are
much wider than the previous works. Furthermore, we prove
that the proposed game is a potential game and give the closed
form expression of the potential function. We also prove that
the maximizer of the potential function is the optimal solution
to the discrete sum power minimization problem under mild
conditions. An iterative power updating algorithm is proposed
to achieve the feasible pure strategy NE. Furthermore, two
examples are given to assess our proposed game-theoretic
framework.
Note that, [2] and [16] also apply potential game to the
power control problems in wireless networks. However, the
theoretic results in [2] mainly lies in the case of continuous
strategies and only a standard power minimization problem
with relative simple constraints is preliminary studied. [16]
only consider a special linear utility model when potential
game is applied and no coupled constraints are taken into
account.
II. DISCRETE POWER MINIMIZATION GAME
A. Game-Theoretic Formulation
Consider a wireless network of n users where the transmit
power level of user i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, denoted by pi,
is chosen from a finite set Pi = {Pi1, . . . , PiMi} where Pij
denotes the jth power level of user i, and Mi is the cardinality
of Pi. To minimize power consumption, each user aims to
minimize its transmit power while the quality-of-service (QoS)
requirements or some other constraints are satisfied. Formally,
the discrete power minimization problem can be written as
min
pi∈Pi
pi
s.t.
{
gk(p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0, for k ∈ K,
NZP,
(1)
where gk(p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0 denotes any given constraint in the
wireless network, and K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. These constraints
may be coupled in wireless networks [2], [10], [14]. Addi-
tionally, NZP means that pi cannot be zero unless some of
the constraints cannot be met if pi > 0 for a given power
strategy tuple of the other users. Hence, users are encouraged
to be active rather than shut down if a feasible power strategy
pi > 0 exists. From the game-theoretic viewpoint, (1) can be
formulated as a non-cooperative game
G1 = [N , {Si}i∈N , {pi}i∈N ] (2)
where {Si}i∈N denotes the set of feasible power (i.e., pure
strategy) profiles of user i and pi is the payoff of user i.
However, G1 is impractical because it is usually difficult for
the users to know the set of all feasible power profiles, i.e.,
{Si}i∈N in advance. To overcome this problem, we propose
a new game G2 by introducing the penalty function so that
G2 = [N , {Pi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ], (3)
where ui is defined as
ui(pi,p−i) ,
{
α− pi + f(pi,p−i), if pi > 0,
α− β2n + f(0,p−i), if pi = 0
(4)
in which α is a positive scalar whose value will be given later,
p−i = ({pj}j∈N\i) denotes the powers of all users excluding
the i-th user, f(pi,p−i) denotes the penalty function [12] of
the combinational constraints which is defined as
f(pi,p−i) ,


−β + n0α, if ∃i ∈ N and ∃k ∈ K, s.t. pi > 0
and the k-th constraint is violated;
0, otherwise,
(5)
where the penalty factor β is a positive scalar which can be
pre-stored at all nodes in the network and n0 is the number
of users whose transmit power is zero. The penalty function
f reflects the constraints in the wireless network.
Formally, the discrete noncooperative power minimization
game G2 can be expressed as
max
pi∈Pi
ui(pi,p−i). (6)
Note that, since G2 does not need to know the feasible power
profile set and each user does not need to know the powers
of other users’, G2 is much more practical than G1. Moreover,
it will be shown later that the feasibility of the solution of G2
can be guaranteed by a properly designed value of β even in
the case of not knowing the infeasible strategy profile.
B. Theoretical Analysis and Results
In this subsection, we give theoretic analysis of the proposed
game. To begin with, we define
ψ(p1, . . . , pn) ,
∑
i∈N
(α− pi) + f(p1, . . . , pn)−
βn0
2n
. (7)
Theorem 1: We have the following main results for G2:
(i) G2 is a potential game with potential function ψ;
(ii) The maximizer of ψ is a pure strategy NE of G2 and G2
possesses at least one pure strategy NE;
(iii) Given that β = 2nα and α > ∑i∈N p¯i (where p¯i ,
PiMi ), the pure strategy NE of G2 must be feasible.
Proof: We first present the proof of (i). It is easy to see
that ∀pi, p′i ∈ Pi,
ui (pi,p−i)− ui (p
′
i,p−i)
=


p′i − pi + f (pi,p−i)− f (p
′
i,p−i) , if pi > 0, p′i > 0,
β
2n − pi + f (pi,p−i)− f(0,p−i), if pi > 0, p
′
i = 0,
p′i −
β
2n − f (p
′
i,p−i) + f(0,p−i), if pi = 0, p′i > 0,
= ψ (pi,p−i)− ψ (p
′
i,p−i) . (8)
Thus, G2 satisfies the definition of a potential game in [18]
and is a potential game where ψ is the potential function.
Next is the proof of (ii). Since G2 is a potential game, then
from [18, Lemma 2.1], we can obtain that the maximizer of
the potential function ψ is a pure strategy NE of G2.
Now, we prove (iii) by the method of contradiction. Suppose
that ∀i ∈ N and ∀k ∈ K, (pi,p−i) is a pure strategy NE of G2
but violates one of the constraints. Then (pi,p−i) 6= ({0}i∈N )
and ui(pi,p−i) = α− pi − β + n0α < 0. Since
ui(0,p−i) = α−
β
2n
+ f(0,p−i), (9)
we have
ui(pi,p−i)−ui(0,p−i) =
β
2n
−pi−β−f(0,p−i) = −pi < 0
(10)
Thus, (10) contradicts the assumption that (pi,p−i) is a pure
strategy NE of G2 according to the definition of pure strategy
NE in [17]. In other words, if (pi,p−i) violates a constraint,
it is not a pure strategy NE of G2. Or, if the conditions of the
theorem hold, the pure strategy NE of G2 must be feasible.
From Theorem 1, we know that the feasibility and existence
of the pure strategy NE of G2 is guaranteed by a properly de-
signed penalty factor. However, it is unclear if such properties
hold in G1. The following corollary studies this issue.
Corollary 1: Suppose that β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, a
power profile is the pure strategy NE of G1 if and only if it is
the pure strategy NE of G2.
Proof: We first prove the “only if” part. Assume that
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) is the pure strategy NE of G1. Then from the
definition of the pure strategy NE in [17], it is known that
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) must be feasible, and
p∗i ≤ pi, p
∗
i ∈ Si, ∀pi ∈ Si, pi 6= p
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N . (11)
Since β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, we have
α− p∗i ≥ α− pi, p
∗
i ∈ Si, ∀pi ∈ Si, pi 6= p
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N . (12)
Obviously, (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) is the pure strategy NE of G2.
Now, we proceed to prove the “if” part. Suppose that
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) is the pure strategy NE of G2. Then from Theorem
1, we have that (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) must be feasible. Therefore,
α− p∗i > α− pi, p
∗
i ∈ Si, ∀pi ∈ Si, pi 6= p
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N . (13)
Since α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, we then have
p∗i < pi, p
∗
i ∈ Si, ∀pi ∈ Si, pi 6= p
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N . (14)
As a result, (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) is also the pure strategy NE of G1.
Hence the result of this corollary is proved.
From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, it can be understood that
the existence and feasibility of the pure strategy NE of G1 are
guaranteed by a penalty factor which is larger than an easily
obtained threshold.
C. Algorithm
Here, we propose a discrete power minimization algorithm
based on G2. The algorithm is referred to as an iterative power
update (IPU) algorithm based on best response dynamic.
Algorithm 1 IPU
1: Set the iteration index t = 0
2: repeat
3: for i ∈ N do
4: p(t+1)i = argmaxpi∈Pi ui(pi,p
(t)
−i);
5: p(t)i = p
(t+1)
i ;
6: end for
7: Update t = t+ 1;
8: until The algorithm converges.
Theorem 2: Suppose that β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, IPU
converges to a feasible pure strategy NE of G1 and G2 in a
finite number of steps from any initial points.
Proof: In IPU, once a user changes its power level, we
regard it as a strategy change event. Let tj denote the time
instant when the j-th strategy change event happens.
Then if the conditions of this theorem hold, once active user
i changes its power level at time instant tj , we have
ui(p
(tj)
i ,p
(tj)
−i )− ui(p
(tj−1)
i ,p
(tj)
−i ) > 0. (15)
Since G2 is a potential game with potential function ψ, then
ψ(p
(tj)
i ,p
(tj)
−i )− ψ(p
(tj−1)
i ,p
(tj)
−i )
= ui(p
(tj)
i ,p
(tj)
−i )− ui(p
(tj−1)
i ,p
(tj)
−i ) > 0. (16)
Therefore, the payoff of each user and ψ are strictly increasing.
Since the power levels of each user are finite and the maximum
value of ψ is usually finite, i.e., ψ < ∞, IPU must converge
in a finite number of steps.
When IPU converges to a power profile (p∗1, . . . , p∗n), for an
arbitrary user i and an alternative pure strategy pi, we have
ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)− ui(pi,p
∗
−i) > 0. (17)
According to [17], the power profile (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) is a pure
strategy NE of G2. From Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we have
that (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) must be feasible and is also the pure strategy
NE of G1 if β2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i.
III. OPTIMALITY
A. Discrete Sum Power Minimization
In the n-user wireless network, the discrete sum power
minimization problem can be formulated as
min
(p1,...,pn)∈P
∑
i∈N
pi
s.t.
{
gk(p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0, for k ∈ K,
NZPCO,
(18)
where P = P1×P2×· · ·×Pn is the set of all possible discrete
power strategy profiles, and NZPCO means “non-zero power
constraint”, i.e., for any user i, pi cannot be zero unless any of
the constraints cannot be met if pi > 0 no matter what other
users’ powers are.
To establish the relationship between (18) and our designed
game, we define the discrete optimization problem:
max
(p1,...,pn)∈P
ψ(p1, . . . , pn). (19)
Lemma 1: Given that we have β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i,
(popt1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) is the optimal solution to problem (18) if and
only if it is the optimal solution to problem (19).
Proof: First, we have the proof of the “if” part. Suppose
that (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) is the optimal solution to (19). Then
ψ(popt1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) ≥ ψ(p1, . . . , pn)
∀(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ P , (p1, . . . , pn) 6= (p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n ). (20)
That is,
∑
i∈N
(α− popti ) + f(p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n )−
n
opt
0 β
2n
≥
∑
i∈N
(α− pi) + f(p1, . . . , pn)−
n0β
2n
,
∀(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ P , (p1, . . . , pn) 6= (p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n ). (21)
Assuming that (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) violates at least one of the
constraints, then we have
f(popt1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) = −β + n
opt
0 α < 0. (22)
If the conditions of this lemma hold, then
ψ(popt1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) =
∑
i∈N
(α − popti )− β + n
opt
0 α−
n
opt
0 β
2n
< ψ(0, . . . , 0) =
∑
i∈N
α−
β
2
. (23)
Therefore, (23) contradicts (20) and that (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) must
be feasible and f(popt1 , . . . , poptn ) = 0.
Suppose that (p′1, . . . , p′n) ∈ P is the optimal solution to
(18) and (p′1, . . . , p′n) 6= (popt1 , . . . , poptn ). Then from (21), we
have f(p′1, . . . , p′n) = 0 and
∑
i∈N p
′
i +
n′
0
β
2n ≤
∑
i∈N p
opt
i +
n
opt
0
β
2n , which can be re-expressed into∑
i∈N
(α − p′i)−
n′0β
2n
≥
∑
i∈N
(α− popti )−
n
opt
0 β
2n
. (24)
Therefore, (24) contradicts (20) and (21), which implies that
(p′1, . . . , p
′
n) = (p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n ). That is, if (p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) is
the optimal solution to (19), it is also the optimal solution
to (18). Using the similar procedure, we can easily prove the
“only if” part to complete the proof.
B. Relationship between the Optimal Solution and the NE
In this subsection, we study the relation between the optimal
solution to the sum discrete power minimization problem
(19) and the pure strategy NE of the non-cooperative power
minimization game. First, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Given that β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, the
optimal solution to (18) constitutes a feasible pure strategy
NE of G1 and G2.
Proof: Suppose that (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) is the optimal solu-
tion to (18). From Lemma 1, we know that (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) is
the optimal solution to (19). Since we have proved in Theorem
1 that the maximizer of ψ is a feasible pure strategy NE of
G2 if β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i. Thus, (p
opt
1 , . . . , p
opt
n ) is a
feasible pure strategy NE of G2 when the conditions of this
theorem holds. Next, from Corollary 1, (popt1 , . . . , poptn ) is also
a feasible pure strategy NE of G1.
Theorem 3 reveals the relationship between the NE of our
proposed game the optimal solution to (18). It shows that the
set of the optimal solutions to (18) is a subset of the pure
strategy NE of our proposed game in general. From Theorem
3, we can further have the following corollary.
Corollary 2: Given β = 2nα and α >
∑
i∈N p¯i, we have:
(i) If G2 possesses a unique pure strategy NE, this unique
pure strategy NE is the optimal solution to (18);
(ii) If ∀(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ P , (p1, . . . , pn) 6= (0, . . . , 0) cannot
satisfy the stated constraints g1, . . . , gK , then the unique
pure strategy NE of G2 is (0, . . . , 0) and is also the
optimal solution to (18).
Proof: From Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, we immediately
reach the result in (i). Then we proceed to prove part (ii).
Suppose that we have an arbitrary power strategy profile
(p1, · · · , pn) ∈ P and that (p1, . . . , pn) 6= (0, . . . , 0) cannot
satisfy the stated constraints g1, . . . , gK which is also a pure
strategy NE of G2. If the condition of (i) holds, we have
ψ(0, . . . , 0)− ψ(p1, . . . , pn)
= −
β
2
+
∑
i∈N
pi + β − n0α+
n0β
2n
=
∑
i∈N
pi + nα > 0,
(25)
which contradicts the assumption that (p1, . . . , pn) is a pure
strategy NE of G2. Thus, (p1, . . . , pn) cannot be the pure
strategy NE of G2. Since (25) always holds ∀(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ P
and (p1, . . . , pn) 6= (0, . . . , 0), (0, . . . , 0) is the unique pure
strategy NE of G2 and is also the optimal solution to (19).
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, we know that (0, . . . , 0) is
also the optimal solution to (18).
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide two examples to evaluate the
performance of our proposed scheme.
A. Cognitive Radio Systems
In this subsection, we assumed a network of n cognitive
users coexisting with L primary users sharing the same time-
frequency resource. One user corresponds to a transmitter-to-
receiver link. To protect the primary users, the interference
power constraints at the primary receivers are in place. For
each primary user l ∈ L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, we require
PMl −
n∑
i=1
pi|Hil|
2 ≥ 0, (26)
where PMl denotes the interference power constraint at the
receiver of primary user l, pi ∈ Pi denotes the transmit power
of cognitive user i, and Hil denotes the channel gain from
cognitive user i to the receiver of primary user l.
To ensure the QoS of each cognitive user, it is also assumed
that the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of cog-
nitive user i, denoted as γi, should be greater than a preset
threshold γMi . For each cognitive user i ∈ N , we have
γi − γ
M
i ≥ 0, (27)
where
γi =
pi|hii|2∑n
j 6=i
j=1
pj |hji|2 +
∑L
l=1 ql|gli|
2 + σ2
, (28)
and hji denotes the channel gain from cognitive transmitter
j to cognitive receiver i, ql denotes the transmit power of
primary user l,gli denotes the channel gain from primary
transmitter l to secondary receiver i.
In the simulations, we have assumed that L = 2, σ2 =
5 × 10−10Watts, Pi = {0, 0.005, 0.05, 0.5}Watts, γMi =
3dB, ∀i ∈ N , and ql = 0.05Watts, PMl = 0.01Watts, ∀l ∈
L.
Figs. 1 illustrates the convergence performance of IPU with
4 cognitive users and 2 primary users. Results show that IPU
converges and the speed of convergence is very fast. This result
also means that the NE of our proposed game always exists.
Furthermore, we compare the sum power results obtained by
exhaustive search (ES) and IPU with 1000 channel realizations
in a 4 cognitive users and 2 primary users system and find that
the percentage of that the result of IPU is the same as that of
ES is 95.1%. This result means that IPU can directly find the
optimal solution to problem (18) with very high probability
and also verify the correctness that the optimal solution to
problem (18) is also an NE of our proposed game.
B. D2D Communication Systems
In this subsection, we considered a D2D underlay communi-
cations network as an example to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed framework. In particular, we assumed a net-
work of n D2D users coexisting with L cellular users sharing
the same time-frequency resource. One user corresponds to a
transmitter-to-receiver link. To protect the communication of
each cellular user l ∈ L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, we require
γl − γ
M
l ≥ 0, (29)
where
γl =
ql|Gll|2∑n
j=1 pj |Hjl|
2 +
∑L
j 6=l
j=1
qj |Gjl|2 + σ2l
, (30)
γMl denotes the minimum signal-to-interference-and-noise ra-
tio (SINR) constraint at the receiver of cellular user l, ql ∈ Ql
denotes the transmit power of cellular user l, pi ∈ Pi denotes
the transmit power of D2D user i, Gjl denotes the channel
gain from the transmitter of cellular user j to the receiver of
cellular user l, and Hil denotes the channel gain from D2D
user i to the receiver of cellular user l.
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Fig. 2. Convergence of IPU with 2 cellular users and 2 D2D users.
To ensure the QoS of each D2D user, it is also assumed
that the SINR of D2D user i, denoted as γi, should be greater
than a preset threshold γMi . For each D2D user i ∈ N , we
have
γi − γ
M
i ≥ 0, (31)
where
γi =
pi|hii|2∑n
j 6=i
j=1
pj|hji|2 +
∑L
l=1 ql|gli|
2 + σ2i
, (32)
and hji denotes the channel gain from the transmitter of D2D
user j to the receiver of D2D user i, gli denotes the channel
gain from cellular transmitter l to the receiver of D2D user i.
In the simulations, we assume that σ2l = σ2i =
10−13Watts, Ql = {0.001, 0.005, 0.05, 0.5, 1}Watts, Pi =
{0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.5}Watts, γMl = 10dB, γ
M
i = 5dB,
∀i ∈ N , ∀l ∈ L. Furthermore, the initial power strategy of
each user in IPU is the minimum power level of it.
Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the convergence performance of
IPU with different numbers of cellular users and D2D users.
Again, the results show that IPU always converges very fast.
In addition, we compare the sum power results obtained by
exhaustive search (ES) and IPU with 1000 channel realizations
in a 2 cellular users and 2 D2D users system and find that the
percentage of that the result of IPU is the same as that of ES
is 85.8%. This result again shows that IPU can directly find
the optimal solution to problem (18) with high probability.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a unified game-theoretic framework to
address the discrete power minimization problem in wireless
networks. By designing the penalty-based payoff function, we
have given the potential function and proved that our proposed
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game is a potential game in which pure strategy NE must exist
and the maximizer of the potential function coincides with the
optimal solution to the sum discrete power minimization prob-
lem under mild conditions. The IPU algorithm was proposed
to obtain the pure strategy NE. Numerical results for cognitive
radio networks and D2D communication systems as examples
were provided to assess the approach.
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